Introduction
In classical expected-utility theory, the value of information is non-negative (Machina, 1989) . A person should never be worse off gathering free information about a choice. Dana et al. (2007) find, however, that if the choice affects the well-being of other people, and if the person feels conflicted about doing what he wants versus "doing the right thing" (based on social norms such as fairness), he may exercise strategic ignorance: he reduces his internal conflict by choosing to avoid free information on what he "should" do. 1 In this paper, we present evidence that a person may similarly exercise strategic selfignorance when the choice he faces affects only his own well-being. We show that if a person engages in a pleasurable activity that may be harmful to his future self, and experiences feelings of guilt when over-indulging in that activity, he may avoid free information on the future consequences of his actions to reduce his guilt. 2 We consider a guilt-averse person who experiences an inner conflict due to presentbiased preferences: he believes he should behave rationally (i.e., in a manner consistent with discounting utility at a constant rate over all future time periods), but since his true preferences are present-biased, he puts too much emphasis on today's well-being.
3 He overindulges in activities that impose negative externalities on his future selves. 4 We assume that feelings of guilt arise when the present-biased person gives in to immediate gratification, at the expense of future well-being.
We also assume that self-ignorance can be bliss. By ignoring information on the potential harmful future consequences of present activities, he mitigates the inner conflict between what he should and wants to do and reduces feelings of guilt. As a result, he may use 1 In a dictator game, Dana et al. (2007) find that 74 percent of dictators choose the fairer distribution of money between themselves and a recipient when they are informed of the impact of their choice on the recipient. When dictators may choose to remain ignorant of that impact, however, only 47 percent of dictators both choose to be informed and choose the fairer option. Van der Weele (2012) finds that even when ignorance is associated with a small cost, more than 30 percent of subjects are strategically ignorant. 2 Carillo and Mariotti (2000) develop a theoretical model showing that agents may choose ignorance to keep themselves from engaging in harmful activities. Although concerned with a similar tradeoff between current pleasure and future harm, the model's implications are very different from the findings presented here. 3 There is a rich literature on dynamically inconsistent, or present-biased, preferences: see, e.g., Strotz (1955) , Thaler (1980) , Akerlof (1991) , Ainslie (1992) , Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) , Laibson (1997) , and O' Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2003) .
ignorance strategically, i.e., as an excuse to pursue his preferences for immediate gratification.
People may exercise strategic self-ignorance to over-engage in a wide array of risky activities-impulsive spending, gambling, alcohol or drug abuse, extreme sports, unprotected sex-or to under-engage in protective activities-saving for old age, buying insurance, getting health check-ups, exercising. All these activities involve a tradeoff between transparent immediate pleasure and less-transparent future harm, which provides scope for ignoring information about that harm. Our lab experiment, designed to test the prevalence of strategic self-ignorance, uses restaurant-style ready meals; consumption of such meals, too, is transparent in immediate pleasure (taste) but non-transparent in future harm (calories). We find strong evidence of strategic self-ignorant behavior, and support for our model's predictions about the determinants of such behavior.
Analytical framework
Consider a person with present-biased intertemporal preferences. Following self-control models (e.g., O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), we represent his utility from time onwards as 
where is utility in period t, is a standard discount factor, and 0≤ <1 represents a timeinconsistent preference for immediate gratification, i.e., the present-bias. Assume the person is naive, i.e., unaware that his present bias will persist over time-he believes his present-bias will vanish tomorrow, but when tomorrow comes, he still has the same present-biased preferences. Being present-biased, the person is prone to over-indulging today in activities with harmful future consequences. Being naive, he each time perceives this behavior as limited in scope ("just this once"). When tomorrow comes, however, he makes the same choice to over-indulge, and so on. Tomorrow's self discounts future utility more than today's self would prefer, and expect, tomorrow's self to do.
The novel element we add to this standard self-control model is a feeling of guilt about the time-inconsistent behavior. Suppose at time the person faces a choice at what level to engage in a potentially harmful activity. To fix ideas, let be the quantity consumed of a food that may be either "healthy" (low calorie) or "unhealthy" (high calorie). Assume his utility from the activity has three additively separable components, , , and , each of which depends on . Component ( ) represents his immediate "enjoyment." We assume this component is strictly concave, with an interior maximum. If the person knows that the food is healthy, then this is the only component of utility. The person then optimally chooses ℎ (superscript ℎ for "informed" that the food is "healthy") given by first-order condition
If, however, the food is unhealthy, two additional utility components kick in. The first, ( ), enters utility negatively with a weighting parameter , and represents the harmful "future consequences" of his consumption at some time > . We assume this component is strictly increasing and weakly convex, with ′ (0) < ′ (0). The second, ( − * ), enters utility negatively with a weighting parameter , and represents the guilt experienced by the person if he consumes more of the unhealthy food than some reference level * that he feels he "should" consume. We assume this component is strictly increasing and weakly convex in − * for all > * , and that ′ (0) = 0.
A natural way to determine * is to consider how much of the unhealthy food the person would anticipate consuming at time when pondering the decision at some earlier time < .
Being naive about his present-bias, the person would anticipate rationally weighing the immediate enjoyment ( ) against the future consequences ( ) , whereby the future consequences are discounted only by the standard factor − . For simplicity we normalize to unity so the person anticipates facing the problem
with solution * given by first-order condition
When period actually arrives, however, the preference for immediate gratification kicks in, and the possibility of over-consumption and associated guilt ( − * ).
The basic idea is the same as in the existing literature on guilt aversion, in which guilt arises when a person betrays another person's expectations. Here, a person experiences guilt if he betrays his own expectations about today's consumption.
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The problem that the person actually faces at time if he knows that the food is unhealthy
with solution (superscript for "informed" that the food is "unhealthy") given by firstorder condition
Comparing (4) and (6) shows that > * , so the person over-consumes and experiences guilt.
Suppose the person initially does not know whether the food is healthy. He only has a prior belief the food is unhealthy with probability . If offered free information on whether the food is unhealthy, even a present-biased person subject to feelings of guilt would always choose to obtain the free information so that he can "do the right thing," i.e., make a fully informed consumption decision. But if ignorance about the potential harm from consuming the food reduces his feelings of guilt, the person may gain from staying uninformed.
To illustrate this point, assume that under ignorance, the level of guilt experienced by the person is (1 − ) ( − * ), where ∈ (0,1]. He feels less guilt, the lower his prior that the food is unhealthy-which holds in an expected sense also if he is informed-but in addition, staying ignorant reduces his guilt by a factor . His optimization problem then
with solution (superscript for "non-informed") given by first-order condition
Comparing (6) and (8) 5 Guilt aversion has previously been studied in inter-personal conflicts: people experience a utility loss if they betray other people's expectations, thereby letting them down (see, e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008; Reuben et al., 2009; and Ellingsen et al., 2010) . To our knowledge, our analysis is the first to incorporate guilt in an intra-person conflict.
For a person to gain from ignoring free information, his indirect utility from doing so, which we can write (hereafter dropping time subscripts as understood) as
must exceed that from obtaining the information,
By revealed preference and strict concavity of the utility function, we have that � ℎ � > ( ) for any ≠ ℎ , and similarly � � − � � − � − * � > ( ) − ( ) − ( − * ) for any ≠ . It follows that if ignorance did not reduce the person's guilt, so = 0 , would strictly exceed , making ignorance suboptimal. If ignorance does reduce guilt, however, a useful reference point is the indirect utility level
that the person would obtain if he was both fully informed and experienced the same In sum, we find that a guilt-averse, present-biased person may optimally use ignorance as an excuse to over-consume harmful goods. We label this behavior strategic self-ignorance. 6 In contrast, comparing (4) and (8) shows that < ℎ : if the food is healthy, the person consumes less under ignorance than under full information.
When we take the model to our experimental data, we need to add a random term reflecting unobserved attributes of either the subject or the choice situation. The subject chooses to ignore free information if − + ≥ 0, i.e., with probability
where is the cumulative distribution of . As a result, for any parameter ,
where "≗" denotes equality of sign, and the second step follows by the envelope theorem.
To understand the factors underlying the comparative statics, it is useful to decompose the change in utility − from staying ignorant into four probability-weighted terms:
The first term, ℎ , represents the enjoyment lost when the food is healthy, by consuming rather than the optimal, higher level ℎ . The second term, , represents the enjoyment gained by consuming also when the food is unhealthy, rather than the guilt-induced, lower level that the person perceives to be optimal when informed. The third term, , represents the loss incurred because the increase in consumption of unhealthy food also increases perceived future harm. The fourth term, , represents the guilt avoided through self-ignorance. Paradoxically, it can be shown (by numerical example), that unless guilt reduction is complete, i.e., = 1, this term need not be positive. Even though must be positive for self-ignorance to ever be optimal (choosing ignorance must reduce feelings of guilt on the margin), the self-ignorant person may increase his consumption so much that he ends up feeling more guilt overall. As we show below, this implies also that a person with greater guilt sensitivity may paradoxically have less incentive to avoid guilt through ignorance.
Consider first how the incentive changes with and . Using (14), we can write
An increase in , which implies a reduction in the person's present-bias, increases perceived future harm from consuming unhealthy food in both the uninformed and informed states.
Because consumption is higher in the uninformed state, however, the perceived increase in harm is larger as well. The incentive to stay ignorant unambiguously falls.
Also,
An increase in the severity of future consequences, , has two effects. First, it increases perceived future harm, just as an increase in does. All else equal, this increases the person's incentive to become informed, since he can then reduce the harm if the food turns out to be unhealthy. Second, an increase in also intensifies the person's guilt in the informed state, by lowering the benchmark level * that he feels he ought to consume. 7 If = 1, so guilt reduction from ignorance is complete, this unambiguously increases his incentive to stay ignorant. If < 1, however, the effect is ambiguous, depending among other factors on the curvature of the guilt function. Overall, the effect of an increase in is ambiguous even if
Next,
If = 1, an increase in the person's sensitivity to guilt, , unambiguously increases his gain from avoiding that guilt, and thereby his incentive to stay ignorant. If < 1, however, the effect is ambiguous. Although Pr( ) must be small at low values of (since Lastly,
An increase in the effectiveness of ignorance at reducing guilt unambiguously increases the person's incentive to stay ignorant. 
Experimental design
Our experimental design follows the work on strategic ignorance by Dana et al. (2007) , Larsson and Capra (2009) , and van der Weele (2012). They used a dictator-game design given their focus was on fairness. Subjects were randomly matched into pairs, a dictator and a recipient, whereby the dictator decided the payments of both players. Dictators chose between two monetary outcomes, or . Outcome was more beneficial to the dictator but risked a negative outcome for the recipient (relative to outcome ). Monitors offered each dictator the opportunity to learn whether the outcome that was more beneficial to himself was more unfair to the recipient than the alternative. Decisions were made anonymously, i.e., the recipient did not know if the dictator chose to be ignorant, and the dictator knew his decision was secret.
In our context of strategic self-ignorance, we can think of today's self as the dictator and tomorrow's self as the recipient. An important difference is the recipient (tomorrow's self) is necessarily known to the dictator (today's self), and the dictator's decision is not anonymous to the recipient. If anything, however, this should reduce the incentive to make a decision that is bad for one's future self, and reduce the incentive to stay ignorant.
In the next section, we discuss our experimental application of the model. A minor complication is that, rather than deciding how much to consume of a single meal, subjects were asked to choose between two meals, knowing up front that one meal was high calorie and the other low calorie, but not knowing which meal was which. Only after indicating their preferred meal did treatment-group subjects face the further decision of whether to find out the calorie content of both meals, while control-group subjects were given this information without any choice in the matter. Moreover, in a final stage of the experiment following the information stage, subjects were told that, if they wanted to, they could switch meals. Since subjects had no reason to anticipate this switching option, our analysis goes through unchanged, except that the function ( ) mapping calories to enjoyment presumably differed across meals. This implies, if we use and to denote the high-and the lowcalorie meal, subjects who initially chose (hereafter referred to as "high-calorie-meal lovers") faced the problem with enjoyment function ( ) , whereas subjects who initially chose faced it with enjoyment function ( ). Only at the final stage did high-calorie-meal lovers who had learned that was unhealthy face the further choice of either sticking with their initial choice and obtaining indirect utility = ( ) − ( ) − ( − * ), or switching and obtaining ℎ = ( ℎ ). 9 Evidence suggests dictators are fairer towards recipients when they are observed by the recipients (Bohnet and Frey, 1999a) and when anonymity of the recipient is decreased (Charness and Gneezy, 2008) .
We used restaurant-style ready meals in our experiment, offering subjects a choice between two meals: chicken and bulgur, containing 900 calories, and roast beef and glass noodles, containing 490 calories.
10 Subjects in a focus group had been unable to determine which of these meals was high calorie and which was low calorie.
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A recruitment firm was hired to recruit 150 people in the Stockholm area of different age, education, and income levels and of both genders. Vegetarians and people with food allergies were excluded for practical reasons. Subjects were told that they were going to participate in a survey during lunch hour and that lunch would be provided on site. They were also told they would, privately, be measured and weighed. 12 The experiment lasted for an hour and subjects received a gift card worth SEK 400 (approximately USD 60) for participating. Of the 148 subjects who showed up to participate, 55 were assigned to the control group and 93 to the treatment group. Subjects participated in groups of size 15-20 and were reminded on arrival that they had been recruited to fill in a survey. Subjects were asked not to communicate with each other during the session. The survey elicited background characteristics including health, label knowledge, nutritional knowledge, and nutritional interest, and also included a set of questions designed to measure general time preferences.
We followed a six-step procedure in the experiment.
Step 1. Subjects were told that they could choose between a meal containing chicken and bulgur or a meal containing roast beef and glass noodles (portions of the lunch meals were displayed), and that one of these meals (at that point still unknown to the subjects) contained 900 calories, whereas the other contained 490 calories. Subjects were also informed that their preferred meal would have to be consumed on site.
Step 2. On private sheets of paper, subjects were asked to rate the expected taste of the two meal choices (from 1= "very bad" to 5 = "very good"), and then state their choice of meal.
Step 3. Subjects in the control group were visually (on a sheet of paper) and verbally provided with information on which meal was high calorie and which was low calorie.
Subjects in the treatment group were asked to choose one of two folded sheets of paper in front of them. They were told that the paper to the right contained information on the calorie content of both meals, while the paper to the left did not. It was equally costly to choose ignorance as it was to become informed. 13 The decision on whether or not to become informed was visible to other subjects in the group, which, if anything, should reduce the incentive to choose ignorance.
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Step 4. Subjects were given the option of revising their meal choice, based on the information they got, or, in the case of the treatment group, chose to get.
Step 5. Subjects were asked to complete the survey and eat the meal they had chosen.
Step 6. Subjects were individually weighed and measured in a separate room, and leftovers from subjects' meals were weighed. The fraction of the meal consumed (categorized as 25, 50, 70, 85 or 100 percent) was multiplied by the meal's total calorie content to determine each subject's calorie consumption. Table I reports our results pertaining to the existence of strategic self-ignorance. Of all subjects in the treatment group, 58 percent (54 out of 93) chose not to learn the calorie content of the meals, thereby actively avoiding information about the possibly harmful effect of their consumption on their future selves. However, this finding by itself need not imply that the self-ignorance was strategic, i.e., used as an excuse to increase calorie consumption.
Results I: Existence of strategic self-ignorance
Investigating the strategic behavior requires examining the subgroup of 56 subjects in the treatment group and 36 subjects in the control group who indicated an initial preference for the high-calorie meal. This is the subgroup for which we can observe potential overconsumption due to self-ignorance. 13 The information provided was short-it simply stated which meal contained what number of calories. Subjects already knew that one meal contained 490 calories and the other 900 calories. We left the "no information" sheet blank due to the risk of any message on that sheet distorting the results (e.g., if subjects chose the no-information sheet out of curiosity). 14 Evidence suggests that being observed, even by people other than the recipient, increases generosity in dictator games, while anonymity decreases it (see Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith, 1996; Bohnet and Frey, 1999b; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; and Soetevent, 2005) . If being observed similarly pressures subjects to "do the right thing" even for behavior that does not directly impact others, then it may reduce their incentive to choose ignorance. 15 Six subjects (all in the control group) lacked recorded amount of consumption. We assigned these subjects 100 percent consumption of their consumed meal. In doing so, we assured that if anything, the calorie consumption of our control group would be overestimated. For this subgroup of high-calorie-meal lovers, we find that endogenous information indeed significantly increased average calorie consumption. Those in the treatment group consumed on average 676 calories, whereas those in the control group consumed on average 558 calories. A t-test strongly rejects the hypothesis of equal intake (p-value = 0.005). The higher average calorie intake of the 56 high-calorie-meal lovers in the treatment group is moreover clearly driven by the behavior of self-ignorant subjects. Compared to the control group's average intake of 558 calories, the average intake of 798 calories by the 29 subjects who ignored information is significantly higher (p-value < 0.001), whereas the average intake of 546 calories by the 27 subjects who chose information is not significantly different (p-value = 0.767). The kernel density estimates shown in Figure II similarly indicate that the skew of the treatment group's density shown in Figure I comes from self-ignorant subjects, whereas the density for informed subjects seems similar to that of the control group.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests add further support: the control-group distribution differs significantly from that for self-ignorant subjects in the treatment group (p-value < 0.001), but not from that for informed subjects (p-value = 0.571). We conclude that our data provide strong empirical support for the existence of strategic self-ignorance.
Results II: Determinants of self-ignorance
We next explore the determinants of the choice to ignore calorie information. The analytical framework of Section 2 suggests that the probability of choosing self-ignorance should be increasing in a person's present-bias, i.e. decreasing in , and increasing in his ability to avoid guilt through ignorance, as captured by parameter . The net effects of the person's sensitivity to guilt, , and concern about future consequences, , are both ambiguous, however. Table II provides descriptive statistics of the covariates used in our analysis. To estimate subjects' present-bias , we used two hypothetical questions. The first asked subjects if they preferred receiving SEK 5,000 today or SEK in 2 months, for a range of values from SEK 5,010 to SEK 5,905. The second asked subjects if they preferred receiving SEK 5,000 in 1 month or SEK in 3 months. The present-bias estimate was calculated as the ratio of the two values at which a given subject switched preferences (the second divided by the first). As shown in Table I , ranged from 0.85 to 1.16 in the sample, with a mean of close to 1. This implies that subjects were rational on average, but some were prone to over-consume in the present relative to what time-consistent behavior would dictate, while others were prone to under-consume. This is in line with previous empirical findings on selfcontrol problems (Ameriks et al., 2007) .
We are unable to directly measure subjects' sensitivity to guilt from high-calorie food consumption, or their experienced guilt reduction from ignorance. Rather, we use Female and Age as variables that are associated with guilt in food consumption: Dewberry and Ussher (2001), Wansink et al. (2003) , and Steenhuis (2008) find that women and younger people generally feel guiltier about unhealthy food consumption than do men and older people.
We include BMI, the subject's Body Mass Index calculated from on-site height and weight measurements, 16 as a variable that may affect the severity of future consequences from unhealthy food consumption. Wansink et al. (2003) find that age also impacts perceived impact from unhealthy food consumption: compared to younger people, older people are less likely to perceive consumption of high-calorie snacks as unhealthy. Nayga (1996) , Cowburn and Stockley (2005) , and Drichoutis et al. (2005) find that people with greater knowledge of and interest in health issues more frequently pay attention to nutritional information, possibly because they are more aware of health impacts. We include a number of variables that plausibly capture these factors. Health knowledge is the number of correct responses by the subject on 11 health-related questions. Health concern is the subject's stated level of agreement (from 1="totally disagree" to 7="fully agree") with the statement "I am very concerned about the food I eat being healthy." Light, moderate, and strenuous exercise are the average hours per week that the subject reported engaging in each.
We also include a Smoker dummy, both as an additional (in this case negative) indicator of general health interest, and as a possible indicator of the subject's ability to avoid guilt about future harmful consequences of current behavior.
Lastly, we include income and education as additional demographic controls. Above-ave.
income is a dummy taking value 1 if the subject's stated income exceeded SEK 20,000/ month. College education is a dummy taking value 1 if the subject had any college or other post-secondary education. The hypothetical nature of the questions used to estimate subjects' present-bias may have contributed to five clear outlier values of (one lower than 0.9 and four larger than 1.05) that turn out to strongly influence our estimate of 's effect. A non-parametric smooth using locally weighted regression (see Figure III in the Appendix) indicates that, except at these outliers, self-ignorance has the negative relationship to predicted by our model. Removing the outliers, as we do in the second column of Table III , does not materially change our results for any of the other covariates.
Focusing on the second column, we find that all covariates other than the exercise variables are highly statistically significant, and economically significant as well. An increase in by 0.01, i.e., just one percentage point, reduces the probability of choosing selfignorance by more than 8 percentage points; compared to men, women are on average 38 percentage points less likely to be self-ignorant; aging by just one year increases the probability of self-ignorance by 2.5 percentage points; for every unit increase in BMI, the probability of self-ignorance drops by 4 percentage points, etc.
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Our finding that women and younger people are much less likely to ignore information compared to men and older people is not inconsistent with the above-mentioned findings in the psychology literature that the former tend to feel guiltier about unhealthy food consumption. However, we showed in Section 2 that, as long as ignorance leaves some residual guilt, the predicted relationship between self-ignorance and guilt sensitivity is nonmonotonic; in particular, a person with relatively low guilt sensitivity (e.g., an elderly man) may gain from ignorance, whereas a person with high sensitivity (e.g., a young woman) may be better off choosing to become informed, and then reducing guilt by consuming less.
We also showed in Section 2 that an increase in future harm has an ambiguous effect on self-ignorance. First, future harm drives down the "guilt-free" reference consumption level * , thereby increasing the person's guilt and possibly his incentive to avoid that guilt through ignorance (this effect is itself ambiguous, though, when guilt avoidance is imperfect). The counter-point is that it increases the person's incentive to reduce expected harm by becoming informed. It seems plausible that the second effect will typically dominate, consistent with our finding of a strong negative relationship between self-ignorance and BMI. The negative relationship for the health-knowledge and health-concern variables is consistent with the second effect dominating as well.
The insignificance of the exercise measures may be explained by two offsetting effects.
Subjects that exercise regularly are likely to be more interested in health issues, and more aware of high-calorie foods' health impacts. However, they may also be less concerned about those impacts, given that they burn more calories anyway. Strenuous (but not moderate or 17 To check for robustness, we estimated a number of alternative specifications. A dummy for whether subjects perceived themselves to be overweight has the same negative effect as actual BMI, but is statistically insignificant. A continuous estimate of income, using the midpoints of the income intervals that subjects were asked about, has the same negative and statistically highly significant effect as the dummy for above-average income. Similarly, a continuous estimate of education, using reasonable guesses at the years required to attain subjects' reported degrees, has the same positive and statistically highly significant effect as the dummy for college education. light) exercise is marginally positively related to self-ignorance is consistent with this explanation.
Our finding that smokers are much more likely to avoid health information seems unlikely to be due to differences with non-smokers in either guilt sensitivity or future harm from overeating. More plausibly, it indicates high facility at reducing guilt through ignorance-a facility likely also applied to guilt about future consequences of smoking. In terms of our model, smokers may have a high value of .
As for the strong effects of income and education (both unanticipated), it seems similarly unlikely that either of these variables correlates with guilt sensitivity or harm from overeating. We speculate these variables correlate with . Could it be that people with high emotional awareness (low ) select into business, whereas people with low awareness (high ) select into academic pursuits?
Concluding Remarks
Classical expected-utility theory presumes the value of information is always non-negative.
Herein we define a counterpoint to this view-strategic self-ignorance. People may avoid free information and use their ignorance strategically, i.e., as an excuse to over-indulge in activities that provide immediate pleasure and potential future harm. We show that a person with present-biased preferences who is conflicted about doing what he wants versus "doing the right thing" (as defined by time-consistent preferences) may benefit from ignoring free information on future consequences of his actions if doing so reduces his internal conflictfor him, ignorance can be bliss.
We empirically test for the existence of strategic self-ignorance in relation to consumption of high-calorie food. Based on an experiment using restaurant-style ready meals, we find strong evidence of strategic self-ignorant behavior. Nearly 60 percent of our subjects chose to ignore free information on the calorie content of their meal, and these subjects consumed significantly more calories. We also find that people with stronger present-bias, men, younger people, people with a lower BMI, people with little knowledge of or interest in health, smokers, low-income earners, and highly-educated people are more likely to be self-ignorant.
Strategic self-ignorance may apply to a wide range of behavior, contributing not just to over-engagement in risky activities such as impulsive spending, gambling, alcohol or drug abuse, extreme sports, unprotected sex, or eating high-calorie foods, but also to under-engagement in protective activities such as saving for retirement, buying insurance, getting health check-ups, or exercising. People may use ignorance of the risks associated with their behavior to allow themselves to "enjoy the moment," leaving their future selves to deal with debts, hangovers, broken bones, unwanted pregnancies, and health issues.
The central implication of strategic self-ignorance is that, because risk information is in fact not free-it comes with a psychic cost of guilt-information is inefficient at discouraging over-indulgence in risky behavior. For instance, to combat the so called "obesity epidemic" in the US, the ("Obamacare") Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 has mandated that, starting in 2013, chain restaurants post calorie counts on their menus. But studies of a similar mandate enacted by New York City in 2008 have found that menu labeling has little or no impact on food consumption (Borgmeier and Westenhoefer, 2009; Elbel et al., 2009 Elbel et al., , 2011 Vadiveloo et al.,2011) . Strategic self-ignorance could help explain why labeling does little to encourage healthier choices.
Overcoming the psychic cost of information may require either imposing additional costs on ignorance or providing additional benefits to being informed. Liability waivers, for instance, raise the cost of ignorance-they shift the responsibility of future harm to the person that engages in a risky activity, and could be used in areas ranging from extreme sports to food choices. Benefits from being informed could, for instance, consist of small rewards at schools and work places (e.g., financial rewards, extra credits, time off) associated with learning about risky or protective behavior. Increasing the salience of costs and benefits may also help. Evidence indicates, for example, that graphic, fear-arousing images on cigarette packages are more effective at deterring smoking than are simple text messages (Azagba and Sharaf, forthcoming) .
Alternatively, strategic self-ignorant behavior may be pre-empted altogether by making use of people's tendency to go with default or salient options, thereby encouraging optimal decisions without relying on people fully informing themselves. Examples of "nudges" (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003) of this type are automatic enrollment in retirement or insurance plans and careful placement of healthy food options in supermarkets or cafeterias. We encourage future research on policy measures aimed at counteracting strategic self-ignorance, and research on strategic self-ignorance in the context of activities other than consuming tasty meals that stick around future waistlines. Figure III shows a non-parametric scatterplot smooth, using locally weighted regression, of our data on self-ignorance against our proxy for present-bias (overlapping data points were vertically jittered to give a better sense of their distribution). The figure indicates that, except for one outlier with < 0.9 and four outliers with > 1.05, self-ignorance is negatively related to . (1) Welcome. You have been asked to come today to fill in a survey on "Consumer evaluations of food." Please choose a seat. In front of you, you have a few documents you will be asked to complete. Also in front of you are the two different lunch meals you can choose from today. You are asked to finish your lunch before leaving today. When you are done with lunch and filling out the survey and the forms, please bring your filled-out forms and your meal left overs over to the back room, where we will be waiting. There will be a couple of additional questions asked there, and you will be weighed and measured. This exercise is individual, so please refrain from communicating with one another in any way during this session, verbally or with body language. (2) Please start off by filling out the first form: the form of consent to participate in this study. (3) Under the form of consent, you will find a form of meal choice. On that form, you are now asked to rate how well you believe the meals of choice taste. You are also asked to choose a meal. One of the meals contains 900 calories, and the other meal contains 490 calories. You make your choice of meal by ticking a box on the form in front of you.
Appendix

Control group:
(4) As implied on this sheet of paper [instructor holds up a sheet of paper-the same as the information sheet offered to the treatment group-saying: "chicken and bulgur: 900 calories, roast beef and noodles: 490 calories"], the chicken and bulgur meal contains 900 calories, while the roast beef and noodles contains 490 calories. 
Consumers' evaluation of food
Consent to participate in the study on consumers' evaluation of food. 
Thank you for your help!
Department of economics
Consumers' evaluations of meals
We are a research group working on how consumers evaluate different attributes in meals.
It is important to know that all information about you will be classified according to 'Offentlighets-och sekretesslagen (2009:400)' (Swedish law) and that publication of statistics and research results will be in a manner that does not enable identification.
Your cooperation is valuable, since your participation will generate important knowledge. It is of course voluntary to participate and you can interrupt your participation in this study at any time, without further explanation.
This project is financially supported by the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research (FAS).
If you have questions on the study, ask them directly or contact us by e-mail or phone.
To be able to relate your answers in the survey to your proceeding answers, we ask you to fill out the last 6 digits of your personnumber below:
State the last 6 digits of your personnumber:    -   (1)  Less than SEK 10 000 (2)  SEK 10 001 -20 000 (3)  SEK 20 001 -30 000 (4)  SEK 30 001 -40 000 (5)  SEK 40 001 -50 000 (6)  SEK 50 001 -60 000 (7)  SEK 60 001 -80 000 (8)  SEK 80 000 -100 000 (9)  SEK 100 001 -150 000 (10)  more than SEK 150 000 (11)  I do not know
Exercise
We ask you to think of an average week over an entire year, i.e., not a particular winter or summer week, and state your exercise habits.
We have divided exercise into three levels: light exercise, active exercise, and sports.
Light exercise is for instance walking stairs, cleaning the house and gardening Active exercise is for instance riding your bike to work and walking the dog Sports is for instance running, swimming, playing soccer, badminton or other sports that raise your heart rate.
Please note the average number of hours for each activity during an average week:
Light exercise (number of hours per week) (1)  Appr 1000 calories per day. (1)  Men should eat fewer calories per day than women to maintain a healthy body weight.
(2)  Men should eat more calories per day than women to maintain a healthy body weight.
(3)  Men should eat an equal amount of calories per day as women to maintain a healthy body weight.
(4)  I do not know 28. Assume younger and older people are equally physically active. Mark the statement that is correct.
(1)  Younger people should eat fewer calories per day than older people to maintain a healthy body weight.
(2)  Younger people should eat more calories per day than older people to maintain a healthy body weight.
(3)  Younger people should eat an equal amount of calories per day as older people to maintain a healthy body weight. Please mark the correct answer.
Fruit and vegetables one should:
(1)  Eat more of (2)  Eat less of (3)  Eat as much of as you do know, i.e. unchanged (4)  Avoid (5)  I do not know
Sugar one should:
Saturated fats one should:
(1)  Eat more of (2)  Eat less of (3)  Eat as much of as you do now, i.e. unchanged (4)  Avoid (5)  I do not know
Trans fatty acids one should:
Dietary fiber one should:
Salt one should:
(1)  Eat more of (2)  Eat less of (3)  Eat as much of as you do now, i.e. unchanged (4)  Avoid (5)  I do not know 35. The energy intake (i.e. the intake of calories, or kilo joule) and the nutritional intake should, according to the Swedish National Food Administration:
(1)  Be the highest in the morning (2)  Be the highest at lunch (3)  Be the highest at dinner (4)  Be equally distributed during the day (5)  I do not know 36. Children and adults are recommended by the Swedish National Food Administration to:
(1)  Eat 3 main meals during the day and refrain from snacking (2)  Eat 2 main meals during the day and snack 2 times (3)  Eat 3 main meals during the day and snack 1-3 times (4)  Eat 3 main meals during the day and snack 4 times (1)  As underweight (2)  As normal weight (3)  As over weight (4)  I do not know
Do you smoke?
(1)  Yes (2)  No (3)  I do not know
